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Abstract 
Attempting to guess an answer to a memory question has repeatedly been shown to benefit 
memory for the answer as compared to merely reading what the answer is, even when the 
guess is incorrect. In this study, we investigate two potential explanations of this effect in a 
single experimental procedure. According to the semantic explanation, the benefits of 
guessing require a clear semantic relationship between the cue, the guess, and the target, 
and arise at the stage of guessing. The attentional explanation places the locus of the effect 
at the stage of feedback presentation and ignores the issue of semantic relatedness. To 
disentangle the two mechanisms, we used homograph cues with at least two different 
meanings (e.g., arms) and asked participants to either study an intact cue-target pair or 
guess a word related to each cue before being presented with the target. This allowed us to 
compare memory performance ŽŶƚƌŝĂůƐŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŐƵĞƐƐĞƐƚĂƉƉĞĚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ
meaning of the cue as the later presented target (e.g., a guess legs for a pair arms-hug), 
versus a different meaning (e.g., weapons). In four experiments, we demonstrate that both 
the semantic and the attentional mechanism operate in the guessing task, but their roles 
are different: semantic relatedness supports memory for cue-to-target associations, while 
increased attention to feedback benefits memory for targets alone. We discuss these 
findings in the context of educational utility of errorful learning. 
 
Keywords: errorful learning, testing, feedback, judgments of learning, education 
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Two routes to memory benefits of guessing 
 
ŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐ ?ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŬĞǇĂŝŵƐŽĨĂŶǇĞĚƵĐĂƚŽƌ ?/ƚŝƐƚŚƵƐ
unsurprising that over the last decades considerable effort has been made to shed light on 
the principles of effective learning. Many learning strategies, more or less commonly used 
by students, have been subjected to extensive study in order to establish their usefulness in 
educational contexts (see, e.g., Ariel & Karpicke, 2018; Grimaldi, Poston, & Karpicke, 2015; 
Kornell & Bjork, 2008; Szpunar, Khan, & Schacter, 2013; see Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, 
Nathan, & Willingham, 2013; Weinstein, Madan, & Sumeracki, 2018, for reviews). One such 
strategy that has attracted particular attention is the use of tests as learning tools (Roediger 
& Karpicke, 2006; Yang, Potts, & Shanks, 2018). It has repeatedly been shown that testing 
oneself on some information  ? as contrasted with merely restudying this information by 
reading  ? produces greater memory improvement which persists even after a long delay 
(e.g., Roediger, Agarwal, McDaniel, & McDermott, 2011).  
An issue of particular interest when tests are used for learning rather than assessment is 
one of errors. When students re-read the to-be-learned information, they are exposed to 
correct information only. When they test themselves instead, however, they are likely to 
answer at least some of the questions incorrectly. These errors can then persist and be 
repeated in future tests (Butler, Marsh, Goode, & Roediger, 2006; Marsh, Roediger, Bjork, & 
Bjork, 2007). It is thus crucial to establish conditions under which incorrect responding 
would not be detrimental to future memory performance. One obvious way to remedy this 
is the provision of feedback. When a student is presented with the right answer after 
making an error, an additional learning opportunity occurs. It has been shown that such 
feedback is effective for learning correct answers in the place of errors (e.g., Butler, 
Karpicke, & Roediger, 2008, Finn & Metcalfe, 2010).  
Recently, a paradigm has been developed by Kornell, Hays, and Bjork (2009) that clearly 
shows beneficial aspects of retrieval attempts accompanied by corrective feedback. In this 
paradigm, participants are exposed to a test on new, never-studied materials. Crucially, this 
test is created so that all or almost all answers to the questions are guesses, with the vast 
majority of them being incorrect. After each guess, participants are presented with the 
correct answer and given some time to learn this answer in the context of the question. This 
guessing coupled with exposure to corrective feedback improves performance as compared 
Running Head: MEMORY BENEFITS OF GUESSING 4 
to simply studying the new materials, even when the time of exposure to correct 
information is much shorter in the guess than in the read-only condition. This 
counterintuitive finding shows that the benefits of testing extend also to the domain of 
errorful learning. 
The benefit of attempting to guess what the answer is  ? as compared to simply being 
shown the answer  ? has been reported to occur for adults as well as children as young as 
five years old (Carneiro, Lapa, & Finn, 2018), and across a range of tasks and materials. It has 
been found for trivia questions (Kornell, 2014), fictional questions for which a real answer 
does not exist (e.g., Who shot a fig out of a tree with a crossbow in the 11th century; Kornell 
et al., 2009), educational materials (Richland, Kornell, & Kao, 2009), as well as learning 
foreign language vocabulary and meanings of rare English words (Potts, Davies, & Shanks, 
2018; Potts & Shanks, 2014). However, the materials that have been used most extensively 
in previous studies are related word pairs (e.g., pond-frog). It has been demonstrated 
repeatedly in many laboratories (e.g., Bridger & Mecklinger, 2012; Huelser & Metcalfe, 
2012; Knight, Ball, Brewer, DeWitt, & Marsh, 2012; Kornell et al., 2009; Yang, Potts, & 
Shanks, 2017) that when participants are asked to guess an associate of a presented word, 
and this guess is immediately followed by feedback in the form of an answer designated to 
ďĞƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?to-be-learned associate, memory for word pairs is improved as compared to 
a condition in which the pair is presented intact. 
 The benefit of incorrect guessing for word pairs has been shown to be reasonably 
robust. It is present for weakly and strongly associated pairs (Yan, Yu, Garcia, & Bjork, 2014), 
persists regardless of the likelihood of making an error during guessing (Bridger & 
Mecklinger, 2014), and is independent of whether the cues and targets are prefamiliarized 
in an initial phase of the experiment, or are presented for the first time in the study/guess 
phase (Knight et al., 2012). However, some boundary conditions have also been discovered. 
One important limitation is that the benefits of guessing disappear when unrelated pairs are 
used as study materials (Grimaldi & Karpicke, 2012; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Knight et al., 
2012; see also Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983, for a related finding). In fact, the opposite 
pattern can sometimes be found for unrelated pairs: better performance for pairs that were 
read in the study phase (Knight et al., 2012). It also seems that the correct answer needs to 
be presented immediately after the guessing attempt in order for the benefits of guessing to 
occur (Grimaldi & Karpicke, 2012; Hays, Kornell, & Bjork, 2013; Vaughn & Rawson, 2012; 
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although note that delayed feedback seems to be equally effective as immediate feedback 
in promoting learning through guessing when trivia questions are used as study materials; 
Kornell, 2014). These failures to detect the benefits of guessing for memory performance 
under certain constrained conditions have shed some light on what the potential 
mechanism or mechanisms behind these benefits might be.  
Two potential explanations of the benefits of guessing stress the same constraint on the 
discussed phenomenon: semantic relatedness between the cue and the target, which serves 
as a precondition for observing the benefits of guessing. The first semantic explanation 
points to the activation of the semantic network that arises when a guess is made (e.g., 
Bridger & Mecklinger, 2014; Grimaldi & Karpicke, 2012; see also Carpenter, 2009). If a 
participant is presented with a cue and attempts to predict what the target might be, one 
word might be provided as a response, but other related concepts also benefit from some 
degree of activation spreading through the semantic network. When the target is ultimately 
presented as the to-be-encoded word, encoding is facilitated due to this initial semantic 
activation. This increase in semantic activation is likely to last only for a relatively brief 
period of time (Neely, 1977; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981), which would also be consistent 
with the absence of the benefits of guessing when feedback is delayed.  
A second explanation that stresses the role of semantic relatedness concentrates on the 
role of initially guessed words in creating the benefits of guessing. Studies have 
demonstrated that participants remember their initial guesses reasonably well (Knight et al., 
2012; Vaughn & Rawson, 2012, Yan et al., 2014), and yet these guesses tend not to interfere 
with retrieving the correct target when tested (although see Hays et al., 2013). It has been 
proposed that the guesses can instead be used as mediators, related to both the target and 
the cue and linking the two to-be-remembered words (Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Vaughn & 
Rawson, 2012; see also Carpenter, 2011; Pyc & Rawson, 2010): if retrieved at test, these 
mediators can serve as additional cues for target retrieval. Again, when feedback is delayed, 
the association between the guess and the target might not be established, leading to the 
lack of memory improvement at test. These two accounts of benefits of guessing  ? semantic 
activation and guesses as mediators  ? will be henceforth referred to as semantic accounts. 
Although the observation that the benefits of guessing do not emerge for semantically 
unrelated pairs of words has been the main driver in developing theories accounting for the 
benefits of incorrect guessing, it is important to note that there are some instances in which 
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such benefits were observed even under conditions in which there was no pre-existing 
relationship between the cues and associated target responses. In their Experiments 1, 2a, 
and 3, Potts and Shanks (2014) presented participants with rare English words (e.g., 
frampold) and asked to guess their more common synonyms (e.g., quarrelsome). 
Experiment 2b used as cues words from the Euskara language which has no known related 
languages. With both types of materials, the presentation of an unknown word was unlikely 
to generate any semantic activation, and similarly the probability to generate an effective 
mediator linking the cue to the target was presumably markedly lower than for related 
pairs. Nevertheless, Potts and Shanks observed in multiple-choice tests the same benefits of 
generating a candidate response as compared to learning by reading or guessing from a set 
of two or four provided alternatives. This suggests the explanations of the benefits of 
guessing in terms of semantic processing are at best incomplete, which should give impetus 
to developing alternative accounts. Potts and Shanks have proposed that when the task of 
guessing the correct answer is perceived by participants as particularly difficult  ? as in the 
case of never seen before English or foreign words  ? more attention is directed to the 
correct answer when it is finally presented as compared to the read-only condition.  
There are two mechanisms through which the enhanced processing of feedback might be 
responsible for the benefits of guessing, henceforth referred to as the attentional accounts 
of guessing benefits. First, as postulated by Potts et al. (2018; see also Potts & Shanks, 
2014), being asked to guess what the answer might be  ? especially if the guess is unlikely to 
be correct  ? can lead to a discrepancy between ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?Ɛ current state of knowledge 
and what they would like to know. This discrepancy drives curiosity, which then translates 
into increased attention to feedback when it is presented. To provide evidence for this 
explanation, Potts et al. asked their participants to provide curiosity ratings at study  ? 
assessments of how curious participants were to learn the meaning of an unfamiliar English 
word. These ratings were higher after generating a guess than either before its generation 
or when no guess was required. This suggests that the action of generating indeed does lead 
to increased curiosity to learn the correct answer, which might then translate into enhanced 
encoding of that answer. 
The second and somewhat related explanation, also mentioned by Potts and Shanks 
(2014) as a potential account of their results, builds on findings by Butterfield and Metcalfe 
(2001) who demonstrated that feedback that is surprising is particularly likely to draw 
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ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐĞŶĐŽĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĂƚĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬŵŽƌĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ (see also Fazio & 
Marsh, 2009; Griffiths & Higham, 2018). This account assumes that feedback that defies 
expectations  ? diverges from what participants consider to be a likely candidate answer, as 
evidenced by their initial guess  ? generates a feeling of surprise, resulting in greater 
attention being allocated to the correct answer as compared to items merely presented for 
reading. Thus, surprise is the second, alongside curiosity, variant of the attentional account 
of the benefits of errorful learning.  
One limitation of the current discussion concerning the mechanisms of the benefits of 
guessing is that, so far, the semantic and attentional accounts have not been systematically 
assessed within the same experimental design. When pairs are related, as in the studies 
supporting the semantic explanation, no feedback seems particularly surprising: participants 
might reasonably expect that the correct answer will be not far removed from their initial 
guess. Similarly, the curiosity to discover what the correct answer is might be diminished if 
participants do not expect it to differ too much from their initial guess. By contrast, when 
the pairs include a novel, not known before cue, as in the WŽƚƚƐĂŶĚ^ŚĂŶŬƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?study 
supporting the attentional explanations, there are no pre-existing semantic associations 
that can be activated before the feedback is shown. At present, therefore, a direct 
comparison of different postulated mechanisms of the benefits of guessing is hindered by 
the fact that these mechanisms try to explain results obtained in different paradigms. In 
order to properly describe the contributions of semantic processing and attention to the 
benefits incorrect guessing confers, a procedure is necessary that will preserve the 
relatedness between the cue and the target, allow for activating a semantic network at the 
guessing stage, and yet promote curiosity to learn the correct answer and often result in 
feedback that might be considered surprising. To this end, we modified the procedure using 
related pairs by using only homograph cues. 
In the present study, participants underwent the standard procedure introduced by 
Kornell et al. (2009). In the study phase, they were asked to learn weakly related cue-target 
pairs for a future test. Crucially, each cue had at least two different meanings and thus was 
embedded in two pairs. Each of these pairs tapped a different meaning of the cue (e.g., 
arms ʹ hug and arms ʹ nuclear), and in the course of the experiment participants were 
exposed to one of these pairs only. In the learning phase of the experiment, half of the 
studied pairs were presented intact: in this case, the meaning of the cue was determined 
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from the onset by the presentation of the target. For the other half, a cue was first 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƚĂƐŬǁĂƐƚŽŐƵĞƐƐĂƌĞůĂƚĞĚǁŽƌĚĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĂƚĐƵĞ ?Due 
ƚŽƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĐƵĞƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŐƵĞƐƐĞƐĐŽƵůĚĞŝƚŚĞƌďĞƌĞůĂƚĞĚŽƌƵŶƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ
meaning of the cue determined by the target, which  ? crucially  ? was presented only after 
an eight-second delay.1 Related guesses served as an indication that the initial 
interpretation of the cue was related to the meaning of the later presented target. This, 
according to the semantic accounts, creates conditions that should later support correct 
responding at a later test. Unrelated guesses ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŝŶŝƚŝĂů
interpretation of the cue was different from that suggested by the target. In this case, there 
should be far less semantic activation of concepts related to the target and, similarly, the 
generated guess should also remain unrelated to the target, precluding its effective use as a 
mediator. However, the actual target should ŽĨƚĞŶĚĞĨǇƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶs, leading 
to a feeling of surprise. In addition to that, the fact that participants could never be certain 
whether the correct answer would be related to their guess should also boost curiosity for 
all test pairs ?dŚŝƐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚĚƌĂǁƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?
attention to the feedback, producing benefits in terms of final-test performance. 
The present study thus serves to simultaneously demonstrate the contributions of both 
the semantic and attentional mechanisms to the benefits of incorrect guessing for 
subsequent memory performance. First, the comparison of final-test cued-recall 
performance between targets from pairs that were presented intact (the read condition) 
and those from pairs for which the guessed word matched the meaning of the target (the 
guessed-same condition) should reveal the benefits of guessing the target as compared to 
being merely presented with it, as predicted by the semantic accounts, and providing a 
replication of previous findings from studies that used related pairs (e.g., Bridger & 
Mecklinger, 2014; Knight et al., 2012; Kornell et al., 2009). Second, the comparison of final-
test performance between targets that mismatched the meaning of the guess (the guessed-
different condition) and those from the read condition should speak to the applicability of 
                                                      
1 Unrelated guesses could either be related to the non-presented meaning of the cue, or not related 
ƚŽĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĞƌƐ ?ŝŶŝƚŝĂůpuzzlement, when cued with 
the word mole  ? paired in the experiment with the words face and hole  ? many participants guessed 
the words Sheffield or lecture, as MOLE is the online learning platform at the University of Sheffield. 
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the attentional explanations to learning semantically related pairs when the relationship 
between the cue and the target is incorrectly predicted.  
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two students of the University of Sheffield (seven male; age range: 
18-63) who reported native-level proficiency in English took part in the experiment in 
exchange for course credit or monetary compensation. Sample size was determined on the 
basis of previous studies using similar methods, in which participant numbers are commonly 
in the range of 20-30 when within-participant designs are used (e.g., Kornell et al., 2009; 
Potts & Shanks, 2014; Yang et al., 2017), and allowed for an equal number of participants in 
each of the counterbalancing conditions. The study has been approved by the Department 
of Psychology Ethics Committee at the University of Sheffield. 
Materials and Design. One hundred and eighty words were chosen from the University 
of South Florida Free Association Norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). Sixty of the 
words were used as cues in the experiment, and the remaining 120 as targets. All cues were 
homographs with at least two different meanings (e.g., arms). Two sets of targets were 
created, each consisting of 60 words. Each set of targets consisted of weak associates of all 
homographs used as cues. On that basis, two lists of word pairs were formed. The lists 
contained the same homograph cues, but differed in terms of the targets associated with 
those cues. Each of the two targets paired with a given homograph tapped a different 
meaning of the cue word (e.g., arms  ? hug and arms  ? nuclear). The mean forward 
association between cues and targets was comparable between the lists (.05 versus .06, 
meaning a 5% versus 6% probability of producing the target when presented with the cue, p 
= .21), and ranged between .013 (for both ash ʹ volcano and ash ʹ tree) and .157 (pole ʹ 
flag). 
At study, each participant was presented with 60 pairs from one list only. The cue was 
presented on each trial for 13 seconds. Target presentation depended on the condition to 
which a given pair was assigned, manipulated within participants. In the read condition, 
consisting of 30 pairs, the target was presented together with the cue for 13 seconds. The 
remaining pairs were used for the guess condition in which the cue was presented next to a 
blank text field for eight seconds, after which the target appeared in the text field and 
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remained on the screen for the following five seconds. For each participant, the guesses 
were further subdivided on the basis of their responses. If the guess matched the meaning 
of the homograph that was the same as the one tapped by the (later presented) target, the 
trial was classified as guessed-same (e.g., a guess legs for the pair arms ʹ hug). When the 
guess did not match the meaning of the homograph cue, the trial was classified as guessed-
different (e.g., the guess legs for the pair arms ʹ nuclear). Examples of trial classifications 
are presented in Figure 1, which also provides an overview of the experimental design. The 
assignment of pairs to the read versus guess conditions was counterbalanced across 
participants, and the order in which the pairs were presented at study and the cues at test 
was randomized anew for each participant and each experiment phase. 
Procedure. Before the study phase, participants were instructed that they would be 
presented with pairs of related words to learn, and that there would be two different types 
of trials they would encounter. Whenever two words were presented, they should spend 13 
seconds trying to memorize the presented pair. Whenever a single word was presented, 
they were told that first they should try to guess what the second word might be and type 
that word into the blank field next to the cue within eight seconds, and then learn the actual 
full word pair (rather than the cue and their guess) when the second word appears. These 
instructions were followed by a brief practice task consisting of both trial types. After 
completing the practice task, participants were informed that the study phase would be 
followed by a test, on which first words would be presented and second words would need 
to be recalled. The study phase consisted of all 60 word pairs from the list, with 30 pairs 
assigned to the read condition and 30 to the guess condition. After the study phase, the 
instructions for the test were restated and the test began immediately afterwards. The first 
words from each pair ǁĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŽŶĞĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƚĂƐŬǁĂƐƚŽƚǇƉĞin 
the word corresponding to this ĐƵĞŽƌƉƌĞƐƐĂ “ŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ ?ďƵƚƚŽŶƚŽĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǆƚƉĂŝƌ
if no response was provided. The time for completing the test was not limited. The full set of 
instructions for all phases of this experiment, as well as for Experiments 2-4, can be found in 
the Supplementary Materials. 
Results and Discussion 
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Study phase.2 The meaning of guesses was classified by the authors as either matching 
the meaning of the cue and the (later presented) target, or mismatching that meaning. For 
example, the guess military would be classified as matching the meaning of the cue arms if 
the target paired with that cue was nuclear, but mismatching if the target was hug. If the 
word was not fully typed in, it was classified as a guess only in rare cases in which it was 
possible to unambiguously identify what the full word would mean (e.g., militar); any 
ambiguity resulted in the exclusion of the trial from analyses. Spelling mistakes (e.g., 
militayr) were dealt with according to the same rule. All contentious cases were resolved 
through a discussion of both authors.  
On guess trials, 55. ?A?ŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŐƵĞƐƐĞƐƚĂƉƉĞĚĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐfrom the 
target and so were classified as guessed-different. The remaining guesses, provided on 
39.2% of the trials, tapped the same meaning and were classified as guessed-same. On 5.6% 
of trials, no response was provided within the eight-second timeframe. Guesses matching 
the meaning of the targets were classified as correct if they either matched the target word 
exactly (bar any obvious spelling mistakes) or both the guess and the target shared the same 
word stem and had closely related meanings (e.g., dance ʹ dancer, but not ball - baseball). 
On that basis, responses to 3.4% of all guess trials were classified as correct. We also 
conducted a latent semantic analysis (LSA; Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998) to investigate 
the relatedness between guesses and targets in both conditions. LSA allows for establishing 
the degree of similarity in meaning between pairs of words, with relatedness being 
represented on a 0-1 scale. This analysis confirmed that incorrect guesses were less related 
to the targets in the guessed-different condition (M = .08, SD = .02) than in the guessed-
same condition (M = .25, SD = .06), t(31) = 18.114, p < .001, d = 3.20.   
Test phase. Given the focus of the present study, of main interest in the guess condition 
are ƚƌŝĂůƐŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŐƵĞƐƐĞƐĚŝĚŶŽƚŵĂƚĐŚthe target word. Correct guesses 
were thus excluded from the analyses, following Kornell et al. (2009). All descriptive 
statistics are provided in Table 1. 
A one-way repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) that analyzed the influence 
of trial type (read, guessed-same, guessed-different) on cued-recall accuracy revealed a 
significant difference between the conditions, F(2,62) = 5.633, MSE = 0.017, p = .006 ?ɻp2 = 
                                                      
2 As mentioned in the Author Note, data files (including stimuli) for all experiments can be found on 
https://osf.io/k6v3b 
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.154. To further investigate this difference, follow-up t-tests were conducted. A comparison 
of the read and guess-same conditions should provide a replication of previous results 
investigating the memory benefits of guessing using a paired-associates paradigm (e.g., 
Bridger & Mecklinger, 2014; Knight et al., 2012; Kornell et al., 2009). When performance on 
the guessed-same trials on which incorrect guesses were provided was compared to that 
from the read trials, a benefit of guessing was revealed, t(31) = 2.941, p = .006, d = 0.52. This 
result remains consistent with the semantic accounts of the benefits of guessing. 
The comparison between cued-recall performance for read versus guessed-different 
pairs failed to reveal a significant difference, t(31) = 1.325, p = .20, d = 0.23. Although 
performance in the guessed-different conditions was numerically higher, this difference was 
very small compared to the benefits of guessing that accrued for guessed-same pairs. For 
completeness, we also compared directly these two types of pairs for which guesses were 
generated, confirming higher performance for the guessed-same rather than guessed-
different condition,  t(31) = 2.350, p = .025, d = 0.42.3 These results are seemingly 
inconsistent with the attentional accounts of the benefits of guessing. 
Together, the results offer two insights into why the benefits of guessing emerge. The 
addition of the novel guessed-different condition allowed us to simultaneously assess the 
semantic and attentional accounts of the benefits of guessing in a single experimental 
design. The results for the guessed-same pairs confirmed the predictions of the semantic 
accounts of guessing: whenever there is a pre-existing semantic association between a cue 
and a target, guessing incorrectly confers benefits for encoding, either because it serves to 
semantically activate the target even before it is presented or because it provides a 
mediator  ? an incorrect guess  ? that links the cue to its target. These semantic accounts 
predict less of a benefit when cues and targets remain unrelated, or  ? as in our paradigm  ? 
initial guesses do not match the actual meaning of the target, in which case there is no 
                                                      
3 For all experiments, we also provide analyses in which data from all guess trials were included, 
independent of whether the guess was correct or not. For these analyses, correct guesses were 
included in the same-guessed condition. The ANOVA once again revealed a significant difference 
between the conditions, F(2,62) = 6.788, MSE = 0.016, p A? ? ? ? ? ?ɻp2 = .180. Performance was higher 
for the guessed-same than read items, t(31) = 3.320, p = .002, d = 0.59. Memory was also better for 
guessed-same than guessed-different items, t(31) = 2.602, p = .014, d = 0.46. As guesses could be 
excluded on the basis of correctness only from the guessed-same category, the comparison between 
read and guessed-different items was necessarily identical to that reported in the main text and thus 
is not reported here.  
Running Head: MEMORY BENEFITS OF GUESSING 13 
semantic activation of the target at the time of guessing, and any generated guess also 
remains unrelated to the target and thus is unlikely to serve as an effective mediator. The 
lack of benefits of guessing for the guessed-different pairs remains thus consistent with the 
semantic accounts.  
The results seem to contradict the predictions derived from the attentional accounts, 
which argue that the benefits of guessing arise when feedback draws attention to the 
correct answer. Feedback in the form of a target associated with the alternative meaning of 
a cue should contradict expectations expressed by participants in their initial guesses, 
creating a feeling of surprise. One could even argue that surprise generated by feedback 
pointing to an alternative meaning of a homograph should be particularly strong, creating 
fertile grounds for the attentional mechanisms to operate, although one should also 
acknowledge that with all experimental cues being homographs, this feeling of surprise may 
diminish in the course of the procedure. In addition to that, the homograph task might also 
increase the curiosity to learn the correct answer as compared to the standard weak-
associates task. This is because at the time of guessing it is impossible to predict whether 
the guess would even be related to the target. For those participants who are aware of the 
nature of the cues it might be particularly interesting to learn whether their guess was 
 ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?ƚĂƉƉĞĚƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĐƵĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞůĂƚĞƌƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚĂƌŐĞƚ ?ŽƌŶŽƚ ?   
Yet despite the conditions seemingly promoting increased attention to feedback, for 
guessed-different pairs the benefits of guessing failed to emerge. The present results could 
thus be taken to suggest that there is no need for postulating multiple mechanisms for 
explaining the benefits of guessing, with semantic explanations providing satisfactory 
account of the empirical patterns  ? an issue to which we return in Experiments 3 and 4.   
Before moving forward with the discussion of the mechanisms responsible for the 
benefits of guessing, it is certainly worth ensuring that the results of Experiment 1 are 
robust. Given the novelty of the findings concerning guessed-different pairs, Experiment 2 
was conducted in order to ascertain their replicability. We also took this opportunity to 
provide more in-depth insight into how participants perceive the different pair types at the 
time of study. To this aim, straight after the presentation of each pair participants were 
required to provide a judgement of learning (JOL) for this pair  ? that is, rate their confidence 
in recalling the second word from that pair at test when presented with the first word. As 
previous studies have shown (Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Potts & Shanks, 2014; Yang et al., 
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2017), participants are generally unaware that guessing boosts performance as compared to 
being presented with the intact pair (although see Potts et al., 2018, for indications that this 
may change with task experience). Our aim was to reveal whether this finding extends to 
our homograph-cue task, with a ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŵĞŵŽƌǇƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ
guessed-different pairs. 
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two students of the University of Sheffield (eight male; age range: 
18-30) participated in exchange for course credit or monetary compensation. 
Materials and Design. The materials were the same as those used in Experiment 1. The 
design was similar to that of Experiment 1, with the addition of immediate JOLs to the study 
phase being the only major change. 
Procedure. The procedure closely followed that of Experiment 1, with one exception. 
After the presentation of each full word pair, participants were asked to rate their 
confidence in recalling the second word from that pair when cued with the first word, on a 
scale from 1 ( “EŽƚĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚĂƚĂůů ? ?ƚŽ ? ? “ďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ? ? ?dŚĞƚŝŵĞĨŽƌƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
JOL was not limited. 
Results 
Study phase. On 54.4% of all guess trials, participants provided guesses mismatching the 
meaning of the target, and on 41.1% of trials guesses matching the meaning of the target. 
Guesses provided on 4.6% of all trials were classified as correct. No guesses were provided 
on 4.5% of trials.  
Test phase. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Memory performance results 
provide a replication of the findings of Experiment 1. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA 
performed on cued-recall data again revealed a significant difference between the 
conditions, F(2,62) = 18.520, MSE = 0.013, p A? ? ? ? ? ?ɻp2 = .374. Performance was better for 
guessed-same than for read items, t(31) = 5.016, p < .001, d = 0.89, again demonstrating the 
memory benefit of incorrect guessing. Most importantly from the perspective of this study, 
the difference in recall between guessed-different and read items again failed to reach 
statistical significance, t(31) = 1.234, p = .23, d = 0.22, and this time it numerically favored 
read over guessed-different items. The difference in performance between the guessed-
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same and guessed-different items was again present, with performance for guessed-same 
items higher by 16 percentage points, t(31) = 5.638, p < .001, d = 1.00. Together, these 
results are again seemingly inconsistent with the attentional accounts, but provide further 
support for the semantic accounts. 
Another one-way ANOVA was conducted on JOL data for read, guessed-same, and 
guessed-different items. This ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the 
conditions, F(2,62) = 21.85, MSE = 0.086, p A? ? ? ? ? ?ɻp2 = .413. JOLs were higher for read than 
guessed-same items, t(31) = 3.600, p = .001, d = 0.64. This constitutes a reversal of the 
pattern found in the memory performance data which showed lower performance when no 
attempt at guessing the target was made. It is also consistent with previous studies (Huelser 
& Metcalfe, 2012; Potts & Shanks, 2014; Yang et al., 2017 ?ŝŶƐŚŽǁŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ůĂĐŬŽĨ
awareness of the guessing benefits. JOLs for guessed-different items were also lower than 
for read items, t(31) = 6.295, p < .001, d = 1.11. This pattern also does not match memory 
performance which was comparable across these conditions. Generally thus, participants 
predicted lower performance when guessing rather than reading. It is perhaps worth noting, 
however, that JOLs for guessed-same items were higher than for guessed-different items, 
t(31) = 3.256, p = .003, d = 0.58. This particular pattern mirrored the one revealed in recall 
data, indicating that even though participants may underappreciate guessing as a learning 
strategy they still correctly grasp that items for which targets are related to their guesses 
will be remembered better.4 
Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 offer a consistent story. They demonstrate 
that the existence of a semantic relationship between the cue and the target is not 
sufficient to improve recall performance when guessing the target is required: the right 
relationship needs to be assumed by participants at the time of guessing. This is consistent 
                                                      
4 When all guesses were included in the analyses, the results for memory performance mirrored 
those for incorrect guesses. The ANOVA was once again significant, F(2,62) = 20.82, MSE = 0.013, p < 
 ? ? ? ? ?ɻp2 = .402. As in Experiment 1, two follow-up t-tests were conducted: t(31) = 5.330, p < .001, d 
= 0.94, for the comparison of memory performance for read and guessed-same items, and t(31) = 
6.129, p < .001, d = 1.08 for the guessed-same to guessed-different comparison. For JOLs, the 
ANOVA again revealed a significant difference depending on item type, F(2,62) = 24.61, MSE = 0.093, 
p A? ? ? ? ? ?ɻp2 = .443. The difference between JOLs for guessed-same and guessed-different items was 
again significant, t(31) = 5.435, p < .001, d = 0.96. However, that between read and guessed-same 
items was not, t < 1, p = .547, d = 0.11. This is due to the fact that this time, guessed-same items 
included those that were guessed correctly by participants in the study phase, which were almost 
invariably assigned high JOLs. 
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with the semantic accounts which posit that it is the processing of the meaning of the cue at 
the guessing stage  ? either through activating the associated semantic network, or by 
generating a specific related guess that can later serve as a mediator  ? that matters. The 
presentation of corrective feedback alone failed to produce significant changes in later 
cued-recall performance. This stands in contrast to the assumption that feedback that is 
ŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŝŶŝƚŝĂůŐƵĞƐses becomes better encoded as a result of being 
more attention-drawing and the operation of compensatory mechanisms that minimize the 
discrepancy between the expected and actual answer (e.g., Carrier & Pashler, 1992).  
It is this latter finding of lack of guessing benefits for guessed-different (as compared to 
read) pairs that Experiments 3 and 4 are addressing. Experiments 1 and 2 were consistent in 
detecting no benefits of guessing for guessed-different pairs, which we view as speaking 
against the attentional accounts of the benefits of guessing in our procedure. Nevertheless, 
it again needs to be noted that attentional mechanisms have previously been argued to 
provide the best explanation for the advantage of guessing over reading in a related, 
although not identical task (Potts & Shanks, 2014), and there is evidence that guessing both 
increases curiosity to know the answer and boosts memory performance for that answer 
(Potts et al., 2018). It thus stands to reason not to fully dismiss the attentional accounts 
before our initial findings are shown to be generalizable across experimental conditions.  
In the study that introduced the attentional account of the benefits of guessing, Potts 
and Shanks (2014; see also Potts et al., 2018) demonstrated how guessing boosts memory 
for two different types of materials: rare English words coupled with their more common 
synonyms (Experiments 1, 2a, & 3) as well as Euskara-English pairs (Experiment 2b). These 
materials made their learning and testing tasks differ on several levels from those used in 
the standard related-pairs paradigm. In the study phase, the cue (e.g., frampold) was close 
to meaningless before the feedback was presented, meaning that there was no semantic 
network to be activated at the time of guessing. This, coupled with the fact that the cue and 
the target by definition shared the same meaning, also limited the ways in which cue-to-
target associations could be established at study. In this case, it is possible that guessing in 
the procedures developed by Potts and Shanks augmented  ? via the mechanism of 
attentional boost  ? not the cue-to-target associations but memory for targets themselves, 
as they become the focus of attention when feedback is provided. Memory for targets alone 
ŵŝŐŚƚďĞĨĂƌŵŽƌĞĐƌƵĐŝĂůŝŶƚŚĞWŽƚƚƐĂŶĚ^ŚĂŶŬƐ ?ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚ-
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pairs paradigm for two reasons. First, Potts and Shanks used multiple-choice rather than 
cued-recall tests. Second, the paradigms also differ in terms of strategies facilitating correct 
responding at test. For semantically related pairs, the task is to identify for each cue one 
word  ? from a unique subset of related items that is restricted by the meaning of a given 
cue  ? that has the strongest link to this cue. When a cue engenders no particular semantic 
associations, it is likely that there are no cue-specific search sets; instead, the search set 
should simply be the pool of targets remembered from the study phase. It is thus good 
memory for targets that seems to be a necessary prerequisite for successful cue-to-target 
matching at test.  
The same attentional mechanism could also augment memory for targets in our 
Experiments 1 and 2, but any such benefit might have gone unnoticed due to the memory 
task we employed. By administering the cued-recall test with original cues, we created 
testing conditions that tapped cue-to-target associations  ? the presumed locus of the 
benefits of guessing according to semantic accounts (Hays et al., 2013)  ? but at the expense 
of memory for targets alone, thus limiting potential contribution of the attentional 
mechanisms to successful memory performance. At the same time, on guessed-different 
trials the dominant meaning of the cue  ? that is, the one related to the guess but not the 
target  ? might have interfered at test with target retrieval.5 In order to test for the benefits 
from attentional boost to target memory, a more sensitive test is thus needed  ? one that 
would limit the use of associations between original cues and their targets as well as the 
interference generated by the dominant meaning of the cue, while at the same time 
keeping other demands of the memory task comparable to the conditions utilized in 
Experiments 1 and 2. To this end, in Experiments 3 and 4 we employed a cued-recall test but 
modified the test materials, substituting the original cues with extra-list (or independent) 
cues, which have been used previously in a variety of paradigms to isolate target memory 
and limit interference (e.g., Anderson, 2003; Anderson & Green, 2001; Nelson, Kitto, Galea, 
McEvoy, & Bruza, 2013). The new cues were semantically related to both the original cue 
and the target (e.g., bomb for the studied pair arms-nuclear), but were not used before in 
the experiment. If guessing incorrectly results in an attentional boost which benefits 
                                                      
5 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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memory for targets, we would expect better performance for the guessed-different than 
the read pairs. 
The change in the nature of the final test also raises questions about performance for 
guessed-same pairs. First, let us consider the predictions stemming from the two semantic 
accounts. The mediator account clearly predicts no benefits of guessing when extra-list cues 
are used at test because only with the original cues can the whole original cue-mediator-
target path be activated. The semantic activation account is more ambiguous because 
although it has been argued that semantic activation primarily benefits memory for cue-to-
target associations (Hays et al., 2013), in which case no benefits should emerge in the extra-
list-cue test, it is also possible that targets themselves benefit from such activation, 
producing benefits across various tests. Second, considering the attentional accounts, both 
the surprise and curiosity account seem to predict better target encoding for guessed-same 
as compared to read pairs. However, the role of surprise for guessed-same pairs should be 
relatively limited, less pronounced than for guessed-different pairs, as there should be 
greater discrepancy between the guess and the correct answer for guessed-different as 
compared to guessed-same pairs. Thus, although the surprise account seems to predict the 
benefits of guessing for guessed-same pairs as compared to read pairs, it would also seem 
to predict these benefits to be smaller than the benefits accruing for guessed-different 
pairs. By contrast, the curiosity account  ? which assumes that the benefits of errorful 
learning stem from processes starting even before feedback is provided  ? seems to predict 
equivalent benefits for guessed-same and guessed-different pairs.  
In order to provide a stronger test of the attentional explanations of guessing benefits, 
we conducted two experiments using the same design as Experiments 1 and 2, but changing 
the nature of the cues employed in the final cued-recall test. Again, both experiments 
utilized exactly the same design and procedure, with the exception of the additional JOL 
task which was included in Experiment 4 but not Experiment 3. 
  
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two students of the University of Sheffield (eight male; age range: 
18-30) participated for course credit or monetary compensation. 
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Materials and Design. The lists used for study were the same as those used in 
Experiment 1. An additional 120 words were sourced from the University of South Florida 
Free Association Norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). These were associated with 
the targets, with a mean forward association of 0.23. These words were used for the 
creation of two new test lists. The lists comprised the same targets that were used for the 
study lists, but the cues were replaced. Each cue now had a single meaning that was related 
to one of the targets (e.g., targets hug and nuclear, both studied with the cue arms, were 
now cued by words embrace and bomb, respectively; see Figure 1 for a schematic 
representation of the new test phase). The design of the experiment was the same as that 
of Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The procedure resembled that of Experiment 1, with three important 
changes. First, test instructions provided after the practice phase and again before the test 
made it clear that the ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƚĂƐŬĂƚƚĞƐƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŽƌĞĐĂůůƐĞĐŽŶĚǁŽƌĚƐĨƌŽŵĞĂĐŚ
studied pair when cued with a new word, related to both the original cue and the target, 
and an example was provided to participants to ensure the right understanding. Second, at 
test homograph cues from the study phase were replaced by new cues, related to both the 
original cues and targets. Third, first letters of the targets were provided at test in order to 
decrease task difficulty, as pilot data revealed too low recall performance when extra-list 
cues were used with no additional memory aid.  
Results 
Study phase. WĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŐƵĞƐƐĞƐŵŝƐŵĂƚĐŚĞĚƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚǁŽƌĚŽŶ ? ? ? ?A?
of guess trials, and matched it on 41.2% of trials. Responses to 3.9% of all guess trials were 
classified as correct. No guesses were provided on 8.5% of trials. Given the slight change in 
task instructions which might have affected how participants approached the study and 
guessing phase, we again conducted an LSA ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŐƵĞƐƐŝŶŐƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐ
have not changed. This analysis revealed a very similar pattern to the one from Experiment 
1: incorrect guesses in the guessed-different condition were again less related to targets (M 
= .08, SD = .02) than those in the guessed-same condition (M = .22, SD = .06), t(31) = 15.17, 
p < .001 d = 2.68. 
Test phase. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. A one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA revealed significant differences in cued-recall performance depending on trial type, 
F(2,62) = 5.914, MSE = 0.014, p = .004 ?ɻp2 = .160. Despite providing participants with extra-
Running Head: MEMORY BENEFITS OF GUESSING 20 
list rather than original cues in the test phase, the benefit of incorrect guessing was again 
revealed in the comparison of memory performance for read and guessed-same item, t(31) 
= 3.076, p = .004, d = 0.54. This time, however guessed-different items were also 
remembered better than read items, t(31) = 3.805, p < .001, d = 0.67. This finding 
contradicts those from Experiments 1 and 2 in which no significant difference in recall 
performance was found between these two classes of items. Also in contrast to Experiments 
1 and 2, the difference in recall between guessed-same and guessed-different items was not 
significant in this experiment, t < 1, p = .902, d = 0.02.6 Together, the results suggest that 
guessing what the target might be  ? as compared to merely reading it  ? improves memory 
performance, independent of whether this guess is related to the meaning of the actual 
target or not. The results provide the support for the attentional accounts that was missing 
from Experiments 1 and 2. In particular, they seem to be consistent with the curiosity 
variant of the attentional account given the lack of difference in memory performance for 
targets learnt on guessed-same versus guessed-different trials.7 
 
Experiment 4 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two students of the University of Sheffield (12 male; age range: 18-
54) participated in exchange for course credit or monetary compensation. 
Materials, Design, and Procedure. The materials were the same as those used in 
Experiment 3. The study phase was the same as in Experiment 2, with JOLs being elicited 
after each word pair presentation. The JOL prompt was adapted to accommodate the 
difference in the test phase: participants were told to rate their confidence in recalling the 
second word from each pair when cued with a new word related to both the first and 
second words. The test phase along with the test instructions were the same as in 
Experiment 3, with extra-list cues being presented instead of homograph cues from the 
study phase. 
                                                      
6 When all guesses were analyzed, the results remained the same: F(2,62) = 7.751, MSE = 0.012, p < 
 ? ? ? ? ?ɻp2 = .200 for the one-way ANOVA, t(31) = 3.788, p < .001, d = 0.67, for the comparison of 
memory performance for read and guessed-same items, and t < 1, p = .784, d = 0.04, for the 
guessed-same to guessed-different comparison. 
7 To provide further support this claim, we conducted a Bayesian t-test using the JASP software 
(JASP Team, 2018) to quantify the evidence for the null hypothesis. This analysis revealed that the 
null hypothesis was 5.26 times as likely as the non-directional alternative hypothesis.  
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Results 
Study phase. WĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŐƵĞƐƐĞƐŵŝƐŵĂƚĐŚĞĚƚŚĞŵĞaning of the target word on 50.4% 
of guess trials, and matched it on 44.1% of trials. Responses to 5.3% of all guess trials were 
classified as correct. No guesses were provided on 5.5% of trials.  
Test phase. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The results for cued-recall 
performance fully replicated those from Experiment 3. A one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA on cued-recall data was again significant, F(2,62) = 3.557, MSE = 0.014, p A? ? ? ? ? ?ɻp2 
= .103. The difference in cued-recall performance between the read and guessed-same 
targets was again significant, t(31) = 2.417, p = .022, d = 0.43, and so was the difference 
between read and guessed-different items, t(31) = 2.885, p = .007, d = 0.51, demonstrating 
the positive impact of guessing the target on memory performance when memory for 
targets was assessed. As in Experiment 3, the difference in recall between guessed-same 
and guessed-different targets failed to reach significance, t < 1, p = .782, d = 0.05. Once 
again, these results provide support for the attentional account of benefits of guessing, and 
especially so for the curiosity-based explanation.8 
A one-way ANOVA performed on JOL data again revealed a difference between the three 
item types, F(2,62) = 46.06, MSE = 0.053, p A? ? ? ? ? ?ɻp2 = .598. As in Experiment 2, JOLs failed 
to predict cued recall performance. JOLs were higher for read than for guessed-same items, 
t(31) = 2.511, p = .017, d = 0.44  ? a pattern opposite to that found for memory performance. 
Also, JOLs were higher for read than for guessed-different items, t(31) = 9.735, p < .001, d = 
1.72, which  ? given that in the present experiments the benefits of guessing were obtained 
even for those items for which the initial guess referred to a different meaning of a 
homograph  ? also failed to track memory performance. These results join the results of 
Experiment 2 in showing that people generally predict lower performance when guessing. 
JOLs for guessed-same items were also higher than those for guessed-different items, t(31) 
= 7.055, p < .001 d = 1.247, whereas the recall data showed equivalent memory 
                                                      
8 A Bayesian t-test revealed that the null hypothesis assuming no difference between the guessed-
same and guessed-different condition was 5.11 times more likely than the non-directional 
alternative hypothesis. 
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performance for these two classes of items. 9 In this case, JOL results are the same as in 
Experiment 2, while memory performance is not. 
 
General Discussion 
In four experiments, we have elucidated several of the conditions under which 
attempting to guess the correct answer at study leads to benefits in terms of memory 
performance at test as compared to merely reading what the correct answer is. Experiments 
1 and 2 introduced a procedure with homograph cues that was designed to test predictions 
stemming from two theoretical accounts of guessing benefits. What we termed the 
semantic accounts  ? semantic activation arising at the time of guessing or the use of initial 
guesses as mediators  ? predicted that activating a meaning of the cue that matches the 
meaning of the later presented target is necessary for the benefits of guessing to be found, 
as it is the semantic processing of the cue before the target is even presented that prepares 
the grounds for better encoding. By contrast, the attentional accounts  ? curiosity evoked by 
the process of guessing and resolved by the presentation of the target or surprise elicited by 
detecting an inconsistency between the initial guess and the target  ?  predicted that the 
benefits of guessing should be dependent on the processing of the target, and so the initial 
interpretation of the cue at the time of guessing is less relevant. The results of Experiments 
1 and 2 were consistent in showing support for the semantic accounts of the benefits of 
guessing as these benefits were found only when  ? as revealed by the initial guesses  ? the 
meaning derived from the homographic cues was consistent with the meaning of a 
subsequently presented target. We further speculated that the unique support for the 
semantic accounts over the attentional accounts in Experiments 1 and 2 may derive from 
the conditions of testing we employed. By using original cues in the final test, we effectively 
maximized the role of cue-to-target associations, thus limiting the role of memory for 
                                                      
9 As in previous experiments, when all guesses (including the correct ones) were analyzed, the 
results remained relatively unchanged. The ANOVA on cued-recall data was significant, F(2,62) = 
3.849, MSE = 0.013, p A? ? ? ? ? ?ɻp2 = .110. Read items were recalled less often than those in the 
guessed-same condition, t(31) = 2.536, p = .016, d = 0.45. There was no difference in cued recall 
performance between guessed-same and guessed-different items, t < 1, d = 0.05. For JOLs, the 
ANOVA was significant, F(2,62) = 50.48, MSE = 0.060, p A? ? ? ? ? ?ɻp2 = .620. JOLs were higher for 
guessed-same than for guessed-different items, t(31) = 8.456, p < .001, d = 1.50, but there was no 
difference between those assigned to read versus guessed-same items, t < 1, d = 0.02. As in 
Experiment 2, this is most likely because correctly guessed items almost exclusively were assigned 
JOLs in the upper range of the scale. 
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targets that could benefit from additional attention triggered by the initial guessing process. 
In addition to that, interference from the originally guessed meaning of the cue might have 
impaired access to targets at test, further obscuring any potential effects on target memory. 
Accordingly, in Experiments 3 and 4 we attempted to eliminate the use of cue-to-target 
associations and mitigate interference at the time of test  ? by using the extra-list cue 
technique  ? in order to gain insight into the potential benefits of guessing for target 
memory alone. This time the results were consistent with predictions stemming from the 
curiosity-based attentional account, as guessing improved memory performance as 
compared to reading independent of whether the initial interpretation of the cue was 
consistent with the later presented target or not. Together, the present results demonstrate 
that the benefits of guessing are multifaceted, drawing on different mechanisms depending 
on the nature of a memory task. 
Our study underscores the importance of considering both the conditions of learning and 
testing when predicting the effects initial guessing should have on memory. In terms of 
learning, our results highlight the key role of the relationship between the meaning of the 
cue at the time of guessing and the meaning of the target in determining how incorrect 
guessing benefits memory. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that guessing alone 
has little impact on memory for the cue-to-target associations unless the meaning of the 
cue activated at the time of guessing is consistent with the meaning of the later presented 
target. These results remain consistent with numerous reports demonstrating no benefits of 
guessing when participants are asked to study unrelated pairs of words (Grimaldi & 
Karpicke, 2012; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Knight et al., 2012). However, as Experiments 3 
and 4 demonstrate, the act of trying to guess the correct answer is not without 
consequences for memory even if the meaning of the target does not become activated 
during guessing. Under these conditions, guessing is sufficient to improve target memory as 
compared to reading the full pair intact. This improvement of target memory occurs in spite 
of a much shorter target presentation time in the guessing as compared to the reading 
condition (5 vs. 13 seconds). This stronger encoding of targets seems to be responsible for 
previous reports of benefits of guessing under conditions of no pre-existing semantic 
relationship between cues and their targets (Potts & Shanks, 2014; Potts et al., 2018). 
In terms of testing, our study demonstrates how different testing conditions are sensitive 
to different aspects of memory traces arising as a consequence of initial guessing and the 
Running Head: MEMORY BENEFITS OF GUESSING 24 
feedback that follows it. To date, studies on the benefits of guessing have mostly focused on 
cued-recall tests in which original cues were used to tap memories for the studied pairs 
(although see Potts & Shanks, 2014, and Potts et al., 2018, who used recognition tests with 
and without cues). We argue that such tests are sensitive mostly to the strengthening of 
cue-to-target associations at the time of encoding and thus they can be preferentially used 
to assess the benefits of guessing that depend on the pre-existing association between cues 
and their targets (see Hays et al., 2013). In order to tap into other aspects of memory traces, 
different memory tests are necessary. We have shown here how a cued-recall test 
employing extra-list cues can tap into memory for targets (see Anderson & Spellman, 1995; 
Hanczakowski & Mazzoni, 2013, for a related logic) as well as potentially overcome 
interference caused by the (subjectively) dominant meaning of the cue (Anderson, 2003), 
revealing benefits of guessing that extend to situations in which associations between cues 
and targets may play a much smaller role. It stands to reason that other tests can serve to 
dissociate the influence of various mechanisms responsible for the benefits of guessing. A 
widely used method for distinguishing between item and associative memory is, for 
example, to contrast findings from item and associative recognition tests (e.g., Naveh-
Benjamin, 2000), an avenue that awaits investigation in the context of the benefits of 
guessing.  
Our study provides new insights into the mechanisms by which guessing benefits 
memory, but the theoretical work concerning this phenomenon is still far from finished. 
First, our study made no attempt at differentiating between semantic activation and 
 ‘ŐƵĞƐƐĞƐĂƐŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽũŽŝŶƚůǇĂƐƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ?
Further work is thus necessary to elucidate how one or both of these mechanisms affect 
encoding of cue-to-target associations.  
Second, our study still leaves some questions open regarding the way guessing affects 
target memory. We argue that our results indicate that a target is strengthened as a result 
of guessing independently of whether the meaning of this target is activated before its 
presentation, as seen in Experiments 3 and 4 and consistent with the curiosity-based 
attentional mechanism of memory boost. However, it remains an open question whether 
semantic activation contributes to this strengthening. On the one hand, the similarity of 
results for guessed-same and guessed-different pairs in these experiments suggests a 
common mechanism  ? attentional boost resulting from the curiosity experienced after a 
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guess is made and before the correct answer is presented. On the other hand, similar 
patterns across two conditions do not rule out the possibility that these patterns reflect two 
different mechanisms  ? attentional boost for guessed-different pairs and semantic 
activation for guessed-same pairs, or perhaps two different combinations of mechanisms  ? 
curiosity and surprise for guessed-different pairs and curiosity and semantic activation for 
guessed-same pairs. For now, it seems that the principle of parsimony should suggest that 
semantic accounts are sufficient to describe the benefits of guessing when the meanings of 
the cues and targets are related and the curiosity-based attentional account is sufficient to 
describe the benefits of guessing when they are unrelated, but more nuanced versions of 
these theories are possible and should be subjected to further empirical tests.  
Furthermore, it is also unclear what  ? if any  ? the role of surprise might be in driving the 
attention-based benefits of guessing. As discussed earlier, it can be assumed that  ? on 
average  ? feedback should more often be seen as surprising for guessed-different pairs. If 
surprise were to boost attention to feedback in our paradigm, in Experiments 3 and 4 it 
should have been revealed in even higher performance for guessed-different as compared 
to guessed-same pairs. This was not the case, which led us to conclude that curiosity is 
sufficient to explain the pattern of results with extra-list cues. However, it needs to be noted 
that effect sizes in Experiments 3 and 4 for comparisons with the read condition were higher 
for guessed-different than for guessed-ƐĂŵĞƉĂŝƌƐ ?ŽŚĞŶ ?ƐĚƐŽĨ0.67 vs. 0.54 in Experiment 
3 and 0.51 vs. 0.43 in Experiment 4), suggesting that surprise might after all contribute to 
the benefits of guessing.10 This issue also awaits further empirical investigations. 
Finally, it is important to note that the main methodological innovation introduced in our 
study  ? the use of homographic cues  ? comes at a price, especially when it comes to 
elucidating the role of guessing in strengthening cue-to-target associations. Homographic 
cues provide an opportunity to disentangle situations in which semantic activation is either 
likely (guessed-same pairs) or unlikely (guessed-different pairs) to spread to subsequently 
presented targets. Their use also enables the examination of the benefits of errorful 
learning under conditions that maximize both curiosity  ? for all experimental pairs  ? and 
surprise in the case of guessed-different pairs. However, the use of homographic cues also 
limits to some extent the clarity of theoretical conclusions that can be derived from our 
                                                      
10 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation. 
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data. When homographic cues are used, experimental conditions are not created by 
experimenter-controlled manipulations but instead are defined by pĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŐƵĞƐƐĞƐ ?
This creates a situation in which at least some of the obtained results can be discussed in 
terms of item-selection artifacts, as ĨƌŽŵƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞthe cues from guessed-
same and -different pairs might have been subjectively different in the first place.  
We also noted that the procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2 could produce at test 
interference from the initial guess: it could be that for guessed-different pairs this 
interference was strong enough to overshadow the memory benefits of errorful learning. 
While we acknowledge that interference might well have contributed to the lack of memory 
benefits for guessed-different as compared to read pairs, we would like to underscore that 
there is strong evidence suggesting that guessing benefits stemming from the strengthening 
of cue-to-target associations should not be seen merely as a by-product of interference-
prone testing conditions, as they can be detected even when interference is controlled for 
at test (Hays et al., 2013). We do believe the semantic activation account  ? which provides 
an intuitive account for the overall pattern of results when original cues are used at test and 
which remains consistent with a bulk of previous studies on errorful learning (e.g., Bridger & 
Mecklinger, 2014; Grimaldi & Karpicke, 2012; Hays et al., 2013)  ? receives additional 
support from our findings, but the limitations inherent to the homographic cue 
methodology underscore the importance of approaching theoretical issues from a multitude 
of empirical angles in order to home in on sound theoretical underpinnings of the 
phenomena of interest.  
The research on various effects of testing  ? including the specific case of retrieval 
attempts preceding the actual study  ? has gained importance in recent years due to an 
increased interest in how the science of memory can inform educational practice. Before 
guessing could be used in classrooms as an educational tool for improving student learning, 
however, it is necessary to understand how and under what conditions the benefits of 
guessing emerge in different learning situations  ? an issue that should be addressed by 
future applied-oriented research. An optimistic conclusion from the present study is that 
the benefits of guessing are quite general  ? facilitating memory for associations and to-be-
remembered items  ? even though the specific memory improvements may not be 
detectable under all testing conditions. Importantly, none of the presented experiments 
found a pattern in which memory performance would suffer as a result of guessing when 
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compared to the reading condition. Thus, guessing clearly seems to be a viable learning 
strategy. Guessing in the absence of pre-existing associations between cues and targets  ? 
such as in the case of vocabulary learning  ? is likely to improve memory for targets, 
although additional work will probably need to be invested into creating associations 
between these targets and their cues. However, when these associations are finally 
established, guessing should still benefit performance because semantic processes engaged 
in guessing can serve to strengthen these associations even further.  
Given that guessing can serve as an effective learning technique, one obvious question 
concerns ƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĞŵƉůŽǇƚŚŝƐƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶƐĞůĨ-regulated 
study. The perception that a given technique is effective in supporting learning should serve 
as a precondition  ? not always sufficient but certainly necessary  ? for using it. Regarding the 
benefits of guessing, previous studies employing JOLs have shown no appreciation on 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŵĞŵŽƌǇďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨŐƵĞƐƐŝŶŐ ?WŽƚƚƐ ?^ŚĂŶŬƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?zĂŶŐĞƚĂů ? ?
2017; see also Huelser and Metcalfe, 2012, for a different method for arriving at the same 
conclusion). In Experiments 2 and 4 we have replicated these results, demonstrating that 
although memory benefits from guessing, participants actually predict higher performance 
when they engage in reading to-be-remembered material. A novel finding concerning JOLs 
emerging from our study is that participants consistently provided the lowest JOLs to 
guessed-different pairs. This shows that presenting feedback that defies expectations seems 
to ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ďĞůŝĞĨin future retrievability of that feedback. This is a 
potentially important consideration given that the attentional accounts of the benefits of 
guessing assigns these benefits precisely to the fact that feedback remains inconsistent with 
the initial predictions.  
Finally, it is worth comparing the correspondence between JOLs and memory 
performance between Experiments 2 and 4 (see Table 1). In Experiment 2, even though JOLs 
failed to predict the guessed-same > read difference, consistently with previous studies, 
they nevertheless accurately tracked the memory benefit for guessed-same as compared to 
guessed-different items. On that basis alone, it could be claimed that participants utilized 
cues that were diagnostic of their future memory performance when assigning a JOL to a 
guessed pair. A different story emerges, however, when Experiment 4 is taken into account. 
Even though the JOL pattern remains almost identical across the two experiments in which 
JOLs were collected, the same does not apply to memory performance: in Experiment 4, in 
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which independent cues were used, there was no difference in cued recall between the two 
guessed conditions. As a result, there was a gross mismatch between ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?
metacognitive assessments and the actual memory scores that these assessments were 
expected to predict.11 These findings serve to underscore a recent point made by Zawadzka, 
Simkiss, and Hanczakowski (2018) regarding cue diagnosticity in the JOL task. Zawadzka et 
al. defined a diagnostic cue as one that feeds into JOLs and memory performance 
simultaneously and in the same direction; conversely, a non-diagnostic cue is one which 
affects JOLs without a corresponding effect on performance. They noted that a cue for 
metacognitive judgments is never diagnostic or non-diagnostic in itself: variations in the 
task, including changes to testing conditions, can create or break correspondence between 
JOLs and future memory performance. The pattern revealed in the present study is a clear 
instantiation of this issue. 
 
Conclusion 
In four experiments using paired associates with homograph cues, we have revealed that 
the benefits of incorrect guessing for memory performance cannot be attributed to a single 
mechanism. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that the guessing benefits that emerge in 
the commonly used paradigm in which participants attempt to predict the target when 
presented with a related cue, and later are tested with the original cue, require tapping the 
right semantic relationship between the cue and the target at the time of guessing and 
before the presentation of feedback. Experiments 3 and 4 revealed an additional 
mechanism through which the benefits of guessing may arise: an improvement to target 
memory. This benefit is masked in the standard paradigm which relies on the memory for 
cue-to-target associations, but emerges when a test designed specifically to tap target 
memory and limit interference is employed. It also does not require participants to correctly 
interpret the homograph cue at the time of guessing: in this case, it is the presentation of 
corrective feedback that matters. Together, the findings open new avenues for 
educationally-oriented research on employing errorful learning in classrooms. 
                                                      
11 Note that the JOL patterns in Experiments 2 and 4 were almost identical despite the different tests 
employed; in each experiment, the test had been explained to participants, with examples, before 
the study/JOL phase commenced, and the JOL prompt presented on each trial clearly indicated what 
cues would be used at test. 
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